Avoiding Wrongful Convictions: Re-examining the  Wrong-Person  Defense by Griffon, Lissa
GRIFFIN (FINAL) 1/28/2009 11:08:31 AM 
 
129 
 
Avoiding Wrongful Convictions:  
Re-examining the “Wrong-Person” Defense 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a “meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense.”1  Grounded in several 
different constitutional provisions,2 this right has been invoked as a 
defense to criminal charges in a variety of contexts and has been sus-
tained by the Supreme Court on several occasions.3  Probably no con-
text, however, has been as controversial and difficult for the courts to 
administer as when a person accused of a crime seeks to prove his in-
nocence by attempting to show that somebody else committed the 
crime. 
This “wrong person” defense4 was first recognized by the Su-
preme Court in Chambers v. Mississippi5 in 1976 and was reaffirmed in 
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 1 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). 
 2 Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (locating the right in the Four-
teenth Amendment due process clause and the Sixth Amendment compulsory proc-
ess and confrontation clauses). 
 3 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961); Washington v. Texas, 388 
U.S. 14 (1967). 
 4 The defense that alleges that someone other than the defendant committed 
the crime has had several names.  It has been called the “third-party perpetrator” de-
fense, the “third-party culpability” defense, the “alternative perpetrator” defense, and 
the “SODDI defense”—an acronym for “Some Other Dude Did It.”  See David 
McCord, “But Perry Mason Made It Look So Easy!”: The Admissibility of Evidence Offered by 
a Criminal Defendant to Suggest that Someone Else is Guilty, 63 TENN. L. REV. 917, 920 
(1996).  The simplest name for the defense seems to be the “wrong person” defense, 
and that is the name that will be used in this Article.  As noted herein, the defense 
has two parts: first, that the defendant did not commit the crime; and second, that 
someone else did.  The defense as a whole will be referred to as “the wrong-person 
defense.”  The evidence supporting the second prong—evidence that someone else 
committed the crime—will be referred to as “third-party guilt evidence.” 
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Holmes v. South Carolina.6  In Chambers, the Court reversed a murder 
conviction in a case in which the defendant offered convincing proof 
that he was not the killer but was prevented by the trial judge’s appli-
cation of state hearsay rules from proving that a third person admit-
ted several times to having committed the crime.7  The Court held 
that the exclusion of this third-party guilt evidence violated the de-
fendant’s right to present a complete defense, a right that is guaran-
teed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment.8
Most recently, in Holmes, also a murder case, the Court reversed 
a conviction where the defendant’s attempt to introduce proof that a 
third party committed the crime was again frustrated by state eviden-
tiary rules.  This time, the state rules prohibited the introduction of 
third-party guilt evidence where the prosecutor’s forensic evidence, if 
believed, is strong.9  As in Chambers, the Court held that the exclusion 
of the defendant’s proof violated the defendant’s right to present a 
complete defense.10
While the Holmes Court reaffirmed the constitutional status of 
the right to present a complete defense,11 the Court explicitly de-
clined to depart from or criticize current state trial practices that im-
pose, under various tests, an extremely heavy evidentiary burden on 
an accused to prove that he is innocent by introducing proof of a 
third party’s culpability.12  However, as this Article demonstrates, the 
states’ treatment of this wrong-person defense is confusing, inconsis-
tent, and insufficiently protective of a defendant’s constitutional right 
to present a complete defense.  Indeed, state evidentiary rules typi-
cally exclude such evidence unless a defendant can establish a direct 
and convincing connection between the third party and the crime.13  
Moreover, even when a defendant is able to offer substantial proof of 
a third party’s culpability, state evidentiary rules typically exclude 
such evidence on the ground that it will confuse and mislead the jury 
and thereby prejudice the orderly and efficient operation of the 
trial.14  When, under the lenient abuse-of-discretion standard for evi-
 5 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
 6 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
 7 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 284. 
 8 Id. at 285, 302–03. 
 9 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 323–24, 329, 331. 
 10 Id. at 331. 
 11 Id. at 324. 
 12 Id. at 326–27. 
 13 See infra text accompanying notes 152–64.  
 14 See infra notes 190, 210–23 and accompanying text. 
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dentiary rulings, the intermediate court reviews the refusal to admit 
third-party guilt evidence, the trial court’s decision is almost always 
affirmed.15  Ironically, then, although there is increasing documenta-
tion both anecdotally and empirically that innocent defendants are 
being wrongfully convicted,16 the courts continue to exclude proof of 
a third person’s culpability because either they do not believe that 
the prosecution has charged the wrong person or they do not want 
the case to be complicated by evidence of someone else’s culpability. 
The Supreme Court’s failure to impose clear standards on the 
admissibility of third-party guilt evidence arises largely because the 
wrong-person defense is unique from other defenses.  Most defenses 
seek to counter the prosecution’s proof by showing that the defen-
dant did not commit the crime, either because he is not the right 
person (e.g., alibi, misidentification, false confession, or lying wit-
nesses), that he is not responsible for the crime (e.g., insanity or di-
minished capacity), or that the defendant is not guilty because the 
prosecution is unable to prove every element of the crime (e.g., lack 
of proof of intent, value, and so forth).  The wrong-person defense, 
by contrast, has two discrete parts: first, it seeks to convince the jury 
that the defendant did not commit the crime, and, second, that some 
other person did.17  The constitutional right to present a complete 
defense embraces both parts.18  However, the states do not approach 
the defense as a two-part issue or as a constitutional question; rather, 
they evaluate it as a question of evidentiary admissibility, looking only 
at the second prong of the defense—the proffer of third-party guilt 
proof. 
The lower courts’ treatment of the wrong-person defense ig-
nores not only the substantive uniqueness of the defense but also the 
practical difficulties facing a defendant in presenting sufficient evi-
dence to support the defense.  Rarely does an accused possess the re-
sources required to adequately investigate and prove that someone 
else committed the crime.  Even when a defendant offers evidence 
that he has been misidentified, either by impeaching an eyewitness or 
presenting an alibi, a defendant often lacks the ability to discover and 
present convincing evidence that connects the real perpetrator to the 
crime.  To be sure, a defendant fortuitously or as a result of investiga-
 15 See infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 16 See The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Jan. 
4, 2009) (providing DNA exonerations count of 226 as of Jan. ,4 2009). 
 17 See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Holmes v. South Caro-
lina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
 18 See, e.g., Chambers, 410 U.S. 284; Holmes, 547 U.S. 319. 
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tion may be able to offer proof that another person had the opportu-
nity, motive, or propensity to commit the crime, that another person 
confessed to the crime, or that physical evidence connects another 
person to the crime.  However, instead of considering the limited 
ability of a defendant to produce exonerating evidence, the courts 
impose a demanding evidentiary standard that mechanically excludes 
such evidence on the ground that it is collateral, misleading, or 
prejudicial to the orderly and efficient functioning of the trial.19
The lower courts should employ a constitutional analysis consis-
tent with Chambers and Holmes that protects both states’ and defen-
dants’ interests.  As in the right to present a defense cases generally, 
the courts should balance the state’s interest in reliable proof and 
orderly trial procedure against the defendant’s constitutional right to 
present a complete defense.  Courts should not evaluate the permis-
sibility of a wrong-person defense by mechanically balancing the pro-
bative value of proffered evidence against the likelihood that it would 
create confusion.  Instead, the courts should undertake a much more 
rigorous analysis of the evidence that recognizes the uniqueness of 
the wrong-person defense.  First, the courts should determine 
whether the defendant has made a threshold showing of innocence 
by raising a credible claim that he is not the person who committed 
the crime, either through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses 
or defense proof.  If that foundational requirement is met, the state’s 
interest in excluding evidence against another person is diminished 
and the defendant’s interest in supplementing his claim of innocence 
is increased.  At that point, the balancing test should create a pre-
sumption in favor of its admissibility. 
The ability of a criminal defendant to present a credible wrong-
person defense is more pressing today with the mounting evidence of 
wrongful convictions through DNA proof.20  Paradoxically, as it be-
comes increasingly apparent that innocent people are convicted, the 
courts continue to refuse to admit proof that someone else really is 
guilty.  Moreover, although a prosecution witness is almost always 
permitted to point the finger at the defendant with only the barest of 
reliability protections and no corroboration at all, defense witnesses 
are routinely prohibited from pointing the finger at someone else.  
An evolved notion of parity—which lies at the core of due process—
 19 See infra notes 190, 210–23 and accompanying text. 
 20 See The Innocence Project, About Us: Mission Statement, http://www.inn 
ocenceproject.org/about/Mission-Statement.php (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). 
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requires a fairer judicial inquiry into the admissibility of wrong-
person-defense evidence.21
Part II of this Article reviews the history of the right to present a 
defense and closely examines the United States Supreme Court’s 
modern analysis of that right.  Part III analyzes the emergence of the 
right to present a defense that a third party committed the crime and 
concludes with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in South Carolina v. Holmes.  Part IV then describes the current restric-
tive implementation of the wrong-person defense by the lower courts.  
Part V argues that the constitutional right to present a wrong-person 
defense is being insufficiently protected under current, arbitrary 
standards, and prescribes a constitutional analysis of the defense that 
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, more reflective 
of what the lower courts actually are doing, and that is likely to pro-
duce more reliable results. 
II. THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE 
The right to present a defense has deep historical roots.  Al-
though until the late sixteenth century there was no such right, in 
1589 and 1606 Parliament enacted statutes that gave a defendant a 
limited right to present witnesses, as long as the witnesses were not 
sworn.22  Further, a defendant could not compel their attendance.23
The right to subpoena witnesses and to have them testify under 
oath was not recognized until the late seventeenth century.24  To set-
tle hostilities between England and Scotland, Parliament enacted a 
statute providing that Englishmen charged with crimes in Scotland 
would be tried in England where they could subpoena witnesses and 
place them under oath.25  Shortly thereafter, Parliament passed an-
other statute giving the same rights to defendants charged with trea-
son in English courts.26  Interestingly, the basis for that right was par-
 21 See infra notes 22–38 and accompanying text. 
 22 See Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 84 (1975). 
 23 Id.  In fact, until 1562, the common law courts did not even have their own 
power to compel the attendance of witnesses.  Id.  In that year a statute was passed 
that required witnesses to appear when served with process by courts of record.  Id.  
Subsequently, the common law courts began issuing subpoenas.  Id. at 84–85.  They 
did not exercise this power in favor of defendants, however, because the courts swore 
only witnesses who testified favorably for the prosecution.  Id. at 85.  By permitting 
only prosecution witnesses to be sworn and instructing the jury to give greater weight 
to sworn testimony, the courts skewed the balance heavily in favor of the prosecution.  
Id. at 84–86. 
 24 Id. at 87. 
 25 Id. at 87 n.62. 
 26 Id. at 87. 
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ity with the prosecution: the statute provided that defendants would 
have the same power as the prosecution to compel witnesses to tes-
tify.27  Finally, in 1702, the right to swear witnesses was extended to 
defendants in all felony cases.28  Compulsory process was extended by 
the common law courts as well.29
The right to present a defense was transported to the Colonies 
with other rights contained in the royal charters.30  In addition, nine 
of the new state constitutions—all but Connecticut, Georgia, New 
York, and South Carolina—specifically provided for a defendant’s 
right to produce witnesses in his favor.31  As in England, the states re-
quired parity, i.e., “that the defendant must have a meaningful op-
portunity, at least as advantageous as that possessed by the prosecu-
tion, to establish the essential elements of his case.”32  Ultimately, the 
Sixth Amendment was drafted to protect that right and was largely 
uncontroversial.33  Like its predecessors, the Compulsory Process 
Clause was intended to mean that the defendant should have a 
“meaningful opportunity, at least on a par with the prosecution, to 
present a case in his favor through witnesses.”34
 27 See Richard A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 1063, 1073 & nn.28–29 (1999) (citing 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON 
THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2190 at 2960 (1st ed. 1904)). 
 28 Westen, supra note 22, at 87. 
 29 Thus, by the time of the revolution, Blackstone stated that “in all ca[s]es of 
trea[s]on and felony, all witne[ss]es for the pri[s]oner [s]hould be examined upon 
oath, in like manner as the witne[ss]es against him” and a defendant had “the [s]ame 
compul[s]ive proce[s]s to bring in [h]is witne[ss]es for him, as was u[s]ual to com-
pel their appearance again[s]t him.”  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 345, 
354 (emphasis in original). 
 30 Westen, supra note 22, at 91 & n.78. 
 31 Id. at 94 & n.94. 
 32 Id. at 95. 
 33 During the constitutional debate, several states refused to ratify without a Bill 
of Rights, and four of those states specifically proposed provisions for ensuring the 
defense a right to present witnesses.  Id. at 96.  James Madison, the chief architect of 
the Sixth Amendment, recognized that he needed the support of Virginia and New 
York, and that neither would give their support without such a provision.  Id. at 96–
97.  Nevertheless, Madison’s formulation was not the same as Virginia’s, which pro-
vided a “right ‘to call for evidence.’”  Id. at 97.  Instead, Madison substituted the pre-
sent language, possibly in reliance on Blackstone’s formulations, or simply to satisfy 
the various states without adopting the recommendation of any single one of them.  
Id. at 97–98.  Regardless, the framers adopted James Madison’s draft of the Sixth 
Amendment, almost without debate and largely as proposed.  Id. at 98. 
 34 Unsurprisingly, when the first Congress implemented the compulsory process 
clause, it specifically articulated the parity-based right to present a defense by giving 
the alleged treasonor the right “to make any proof that he can produce, by lawful wit-
ness” and to have “like process of the court to compel his witnesses to appear at his 
trial, as is usually granted to compel witnesses to appear on behalf of the prosecution 
against him.”  Id. at 100–01 (citing Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9. § 29, 1 Stat. 119 
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The first cases asserting a right to present a defense in the Su-
preme Court were decided pursuant to common law and not on con-
stitutional grounds.  The first case, United States v. Reid,35 was an ap-
peal from a murder conviction tried under federal admiralty law, 
incorporating state law.36  The lower court excluded the testimony of 
an accomplice under a Virginia statute that excluded the testimony of 
an accomplice tried separately from the defendant.37  The Court up-
held the exclusion, ruling that the right to call an accomplice as a de-
fense witness was neither in the Bill of Rights nor the Judiciary Act of 
1789.38
Gradually the Supreme Court began to articulate due process 
grounds for a right to be heard in civil cases.39  From there the Court 
also found a due process right to present a defense in criminal cases, 
a right that was violated by exclusion of defense evidence, but only 
when a defense was prohibited in its entirety.  Thus, for example, in 
1925 in Cooke v. United States,40 the Court reversed a criminal convic-
tion based on what it found to be a violation of a constitutional right 
to present a defense. In Cooke,  the defendant, an attorney, was held 
in summary contempt based on a letter he had written to a federal 
judge requesting that the judge recuse himself from several related 
cases.41  Cooke admitted sending the letter but was prevented at trial 
from making any statement in his defense.42  Subsequently, he was 
convicted.43  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defen-
dant’s Fifth Amendment due process right to present a defense was 
(1790) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1970)).  Shortly thereafter, in 
1807, the compulsory process clause was applied in the infamous treason and mis-
demeanor trials of Aaron Burr.  Id. at 101–07.  In that case, Chief Justice Marshall 
held that if the President denied the defense access to evidence that might bear on 
the defendant’s innocence, the prosecution should be dismissed.  Id. at 107. 
 35 53 U.S. 361 (1 How.) (1852), overruled by Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 
469–72 (1918). 
 36 Id. at 361–63. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Essentially, the Court dealt with state exclusion of evidence not on a constitu-
tional basis but on the basis of state statute or the Supreme Court’s supervisory pow-
ers.  Id. at 364–66.  It was not until the 1960s that the exclusion of defense evidence 
was presented as a constitutional issue.  See infra notes 50–81 and accompanying text.  
Reid was overruled in 1918 by Rosen.  In Rosen, the Court upheld the refusal to dis-
qualify a government witness on the basis of a prior forgery conviction.  Id. 
 39 See, e.g., Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876); McVeigh v. United States, 78 
U.S. (1 Wall.) 259 (1871). 
 40 267 U.S. 517 (1925). 
 41 Id. at 532–34, 540. 
 42 Id. at 537–38. 
 43 Id. at 532. 
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violated.44  The Court recognized a defense right “to call witnesses to 
give testimony, relevant either to the issue of complete exculpation or 
in extenuation of the offense and in mitigation of the penalty to be 
imposed.”45  Similarly, in In Re Oliver,46 a state habeas corpus case, the 
defendant testified before a special investigatory body and was 
charged with criminal contempt.47  At a secret contempt trial, the 
judge, sitting as the fact finder, found that the defendant’s grand jury 
testimony lacked credibility and convicted and sentenced the defen-
dant for contempt.48  The Court found a violation of the defendant’s 
right to a public trial and to Fourteenth Amendment due process of 
law because he was not given “a reasonable opportunity to defend 
himself . . . .”49
The 1960s saw the beginning of the Supreme Court’s modern 
jurisprudence on the right to present a defense.  In a series of five 
cases culminating with Holmes v. South Carolina50 in 2006, the Court 
articulated a constitutional right to present a defense that can be vio-
lated where the defense is only partially excluded.51  The right is 
based on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process as well as the 
Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory process and confrontation. 
First, in 1961, in Ferguson v. Georgia,52 the defendant was prohib-
ited by a state disqualification statute from testifying in his own de-
fense and was permitted only to give an unsworn narrative.  Consis-
tent with its practice of deciding cases based on enumerated 
constitutional rights where possible, the Court held that the state rule 
violated the defendant’s right to counsel, a right that had already 
been incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause.53  Concurring in the reversal, Jus-
 44 Id. at 537. 
 45 Id. 
 46 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
 47 Id. at 258–59. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 273. 
 50 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
 51 Id. at 330–31. 
 52 365 U.S. 570 (1961).  The statute at issue in the case was part of a larger statu-
tory scheme that declared a criminal defendant incompetent to testify.  Id. at 570–71. 
 53 In fact, however, as Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion notes, Ferguson 
was “not a right-to-counsel case.”  Id. at 599 (Frankfurter, J. concurring).  “It is for-
malism run riot to find that the division into two separate sections of what is organi-
cally inseparable may not for reviewing purpose be treated as a single, appealable 
unit.  This Court, of course, determines the scope of its reviewing power over a state 
court judgment.”  Id. at 600.  Counsel assisted the defendant at every turn, and he 
would have said the same thing even if he had been questioned by his lawyer; the 
problem was that the statement would have carried greater weight if it had been un-
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tice Frankfurter would have reached the constitutionality of the dis-
qualification statute and would have held the state statute unconstitu-
tional.54  In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Clark would also 
have held the statute to be a violation of due process.55
Next, in Washington v. Texas,56 the Court expressly recognized a 
fundamental right to obtain and present witnesses under the Com-
pulsory Process Clause and held that the Sixth Amendment right was 
incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.57  
Here, as it had in Rosen, the Court struck down a state statute that de-
clared accomplices incompetent to testify.58  The Court clearly identi-
fied a constitutional “right to present a defense” based on the com-
pulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment.59  Interpreting that 
right, the Court held that the Texas disqualification rule violated the 
compulsory process clause because it was arbitrary, i.e., because it was 
based on “a priori categories that presumed [the witnesses] unworthy 
of belief . . .  without any individual showing that they were untrust-
der oath.  Justice Clark, joined by Justice Frankfurter, would have held that the in-
competence statute violated due process.  Id. at 601 (Clark, J. concurring).  The basis 
of the decision reflects the fact that the compulsory process clause was not yet bind-
ing on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, while the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel had already been incorporated.  See id.; Nagareda, supra note 27, at 
1076 nn.41–44. 
 54 Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 600–01 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 55 Id. at 602 (Clark, J., concurring). 
 56 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
 57 Id. at 19. 
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their at-
tendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, 
the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the 
prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.  Just as 
an accused has the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the 
purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his 
own witnesses to establish a defense. 
Id. 
 58 Id. at 23–24.  In doing so, the Court expanded the compulsory process clause 
to require the actual admission of evidence—the right to put witnesses on the 
stand—rather than simply a right to a procedure to compel the attendance of wit-
nesses.  The Court observed that it would be odd “to commit the futile act of giving 
to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he 
had no right to use.”  Id. at 22–23.  Commentators agree.  See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, 
THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 132 (1997) (“[I]f the 
accused, in order to show his innocence, is generally empowered to drag a human 
being, against her will, into the courtroom to tell the truth, surely he must also enjoy 
the lesser-included rights to present other truthful evidence that in no way infringes 
on another human being’s autonomy.  These lesser-included rights are plainly pre-
supposed by the compulsory process clause.”).  See also Nagareda, supra note 27, at 
1074.
 59 Washington, 388 U.S. at 19. 
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worthy, or that the jury was incapable of properly evaluating their tes-
timony,”60 and because it “arbitrarily denied [the defendant] the 
right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally 
capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and 
whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the de-
fense.”61  The Court also condemned the rule as disproportionate to 
the purpose it was designed to serve—to exclude false testimony—
because that interest could have been satisfied simply by leaving ques-
tions of weight and credibility to the jury.62  The Court also noted the 
inherent unfairness of a rule that allowed the prosecution to use the 
testimony of an accomplice but that prohibited the defendant’s use 
of the testimony.63
Next, in Crane v. Kentucky,64 the Court reversed a conviction 
where the defendant was prohibited from presenting evidence estab-
lishing that his confession was involuntary.65  The trial court found 
the confession voluntary after a hearing and later at trial precluded 
the defendant from presenting evidence of the circumstances under 
which it was made.66  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
circumstances of the confession were relevant to its reliability and 
that the preclusion violated the defendant’s right to “a fair opportu-
nity to present a defense.”67  Significantly, the Court in Crane identi-
fied several sources of the right to present a defense: the due process, 
compulsory process, and confrontation clauses.68
Applying the balancing-of-interests test articulated in Washington, 
the Court found the exclusion of evidence of involuntariness to be 
unconstitutional.  Indeed, in language extremely relevant to the not 
yet recognized wrong-person defense, the Court explained that 
“[s]tripped of the power to describe to the jury the circumstances 
 60 Westen, supra note 22, at 113. 
 61 Washington, 388 U.S. at 23. 
 62 Id. at 22 (citing Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918)). 
 63 Id. 
 64 476 U.S. 683 (1986). 
 65 See id. at 683. 
 66 Id. at 684. 
 67 Id. at 687.  “In the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this kind 
of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecu-
tor’s case encounter and ‘survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.’”  Id. 
at 690–91 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)). 
 68 Whether rooted directly in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, or in the Compulsory Process or confrontation 
clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants “a 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.Id. at 690 (citing California v. 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)) (internal citations omitted). 
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that prompted his confession, the defendant is effectively disabled 
from answering the one question every rational juror needs an-
swered: If the defendant is innocent, why did he previously admit his 
guilt?”69  The Court recognized that judges have broad discretion to 
exclude evidence that poses a risk of confusion, prejudice, or harass-
ment, but concluded that exclusion of this evidence violated due 
process of law.70
Rock v. Arkansas71 was decided next.  In Rock, the Court recog-
nized a defendant’s right to testify as part of the right to present a 
complete defense.72  Accordingly, it struck down a state’s per se ban 
on the admission of post-hypnotically refreshed testimony.73  Al-
though the defendant testified and offered other evidence, the trial 
court refused to permit her to give hypnotically-refreshed testimony, 
and she was subsequently convicted.74  The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that the statutory per se ban violated the defendant’s right to 
testify.  It found that right, once again, in the due process clause and 
in the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment, but also as 
a corollary to the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against compelled 
testimony.75
The Court again relied on the Washington balancing test, under 
which evidentiary restrictions on a defendant’s right to present a de-
fense may be sustained only if the restrictions are not “arbitrary or 
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.”76  Ap-
plying this standard, the Court held that the per se ban was dispro-
portionate to the interest in reliable testimony because there were 
less restrictive yet sufficient means for the jury to evaluate the reliabil-
ity of the defendant’s hypnotically refreshed testimony (e.g., tapes of 
the hypnosis sessions, cross-examination of the examiner and of the 
 69 Id. at 689. 
 70 Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. 
 71 483 U.S. 44 (1987). 
 72 Id. at 49. 
 73 Id. at 56.  The defendant had been charged with murdering her husband.  She 
claimed that the killing was an accident; interviewed by the police at the scene, she 
stated that it occurred accidentally, during a scuffle over a gun after her husband 
had beaten her.  Her memory of the event was incomplete.  After two hypnosis ses-
sions, she recalled that he had not had her finger on the trigger when the gun had 
fired but that the gun had discharged accidentally after her husband had grabbed 
her arm.  This accidental firing was corroborated by a firearms expert who testified 
that the gun was defective and capable of firing without the trigger being pulled.  Id. 
at 45–47. 
 74 Id. at 47. 
 75 Id. at 62. 
 76 Id. at 55–56. 
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defendant), as well as evidence to corroborate it.  The per se exclu-
sion was arbitrary because it was disproportionate to the state’s inter-
est in reliable proof.77
Lastly, in United States v. Scheffer,78 the Supreme Court addressed 
the constitutionality of the army’s per se ban against the admission of 
polygraph evidence.  Here, however, the Court upheld the ban.  In 
Scheffer, the defendant was convicted by court martial of various 
crimes, including wrongfully using methamphetamine.  He had been 
working undercover for the army, and his defense was “innocent in-
gestion”—that he had used the drugs to further his undercover inves-
tigation.79  He testified on his own behalf but was prohibited from in-
troducing polygraph evidence.80
The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces re-
versed.  The Supreme Court then reversed the court of appeals and 
upheld the exclusion.  The Court reasoned that there was no consen-
sus that polygraph evidence is reliable and that the per se ban was a 
“rational and proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest 
in barring unreliable evidence.”81
III. THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A WRONG-PERSON DEFENSE 
The constitutional right to present a wrong-person defense has 
been addressed by the Supreme Court in two opinions: Chambers v. 
Mississippi82 and Holmes v. South Carolina.83
In Chambers, the defendant was charged with murdering a police 
officer.  His defense had two parts.84  The first was that he had not 
 77 Rock, 483 U.S. at 61. 
 78 523 U.S. 303 (1998). 
 79 Id. at 306. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 312.  In Scheffer, the majority held that the Rock, Washington, and Chambers 
precedents did not support the right to introduce polygraph evidence because, 
unlike those cases, the exclusion of the polygraph evidence did not “implicate any 
significant interest of the accused.”  Id. at 316–17.  In Scheffer, unlike in Rock, the de-
fendant fully presented his testimony and no eyewitness was prohibited from testify-
ing.  In fact, Scheffer had not been barred from eliciting any substantive proof: he 
had been prevented only from eliciting testimony to bolster his credibility.  Id. at 317.  
Justice Stevens dissented.  He would have held that a rule barring a defendant “from 
introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility” impairs the 
meaningful opportunity to present a defense.  Id. at 331–32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
The evidence was not otherwise available, strongly supported his defense, and its ex-
clusion may have affected the outcome.  Accordingly, it unquestionably infringed an 
important interest of the accused, which Justice Stevens believed had been underval-
ued by the Court.  Id. 
 82 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
 83 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
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been the shooter.85  Only one officer testified that he saw Chambers 
fire the fatal shots.86  No weapon was recovered, and there was no 
proof that Chambers ever owned the weapon.87  Moreover, although 
three officers testified that they saw the deceased shoot at Chambers, 
none of them examined Chambers to see if he was alive or armed.88  
One witness who was standing near the shooting and looking at 
Chambers said that he was sure that Chambers had not fired the 
shots.89
Chambers’ second defense was that one McDonald was the 
shooter—a wrong-person defense.90  McDonald had confessed to the 
murder on four separate occasions; once to Chambers’ counsel and 
to three different friends.91  One witness to the shooting said he saw 
McDonald shoot the officer, and the deceased’s cousin testified that 
he saw McDonald with a pistol after the shooting.92  McDonald was 
charged with murder, but when he repudiated his confession to 
counsel at a preliminary hearing, he was released.93
At trial, after the state failed to put McDonald on the stand, 
Chambers called him as a witness in an attempt to introduce his con-
fessions.94  McDonald repudiated them on the witness stand.95  Cham-
bers was not permitted to cross-examine him as an adverse witness 
based on Mississippi’s voucher rule, which prevented parties from 
impeaching their own witnesses.96
Chambers then attempted to introduce McDonald’s confessions 
by calling the three people to whom he had confessed.97  Each of 
them was a close friend of McDonald, and other evidence corrobo-
rated their testimony.98  The trial court sustained the State’s objection 
to these statements because the state hearsay rule did not include an 
 84 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 288–89. 
 85 Id. at 289. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 289. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 291. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 291–92. 
 97 Id. at 292–93. 
 98 Id. at 293. 
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exception for statements against penal interest.99  The state supreme 
court affirmed.100
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, finding a vio-
lation of due process of law.101  First, it recognized that “[f]ew rights 
are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in 
his own defense.”102  The Court held that, in combination, the strict 
application of the state voucher rule and the refusal to allow the de-
fense to elicit evidence that another person had repeatedly confessed 
to the crime violated the defendant’s due process rights.103  Here, 
where “the testimony rejected by the trial court . . . bore persuasive 
assurances of trustworthiness”104 and “was critical to Chambers’ de-
fense,”105 its exclusion deprived Chambers of his rights “to a fair op-
portunity to defend against the State’s accusations” and “to present 
witnesses in his own behalf.”106
However, in reversing, the Court attempted to limit the prece-
dential effect of its ruling: 
In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of con-
stitutional law.  Nor does our holding signal any diminution in 
the respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establish-
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 302. 
 102 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. 
 103 Id. at 294, 302. 
 104 Id. at 302.  Each of the “confessions was made spontaneously to a close ac-
quaintance shortly after the murder”; each was corroborated by other evidence (an-
other confession, an eyewitness, testimony that McDonald had a gun immediately 
after the shooting, prior ownership of a .22 caliber revolver, a statement after one 
confession that his friend not “mess him up,” and subsequent purchase of a new 
weapon); and the statement was manifestly against interest.  Id. at 300–01.  Moreover, 
McDonald was present in the courtroom and “could have been cross-examined by 
the State, and his demeanor and responses weighed by the jury.”  Id. 
 105 Id. at 302.  Chambers presented eyewitness testimony that he was not the 
shooter.  Id. at 289.  Still, the Court held that the excluded evidence was “critical to 
[his] defense.”  Id. at 302. 
Chambers had, however, chipped away at the fringes of McDonald’s 
story by introducing admissible testimony from other sources indicat-
ing that he had not been seen in the cafe where he said he was when 
the shooting started, that he had not been having beer with Turner, 
and that he possessed a .22 pistol at the time of the crime.  But all that 
remained from McDonald’s own testimony was a single written confes-
sion countered by an arguably acceptable renunciation.  Chambers’ de-
fense was far less persuasive than it might have been had he been given 
an opportunity to subject McDonald’s statements to cross-examination 
or had the other confessions been admitted. 
Id. at 294. 
 106 Id. 
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ment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and 
procedures.  Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts 
and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court de-
prived Chambers of a fair trial.107
In 2006, the Supreme Court decided Holmes v. South Carolina.108  
That decision, like Chambers, recognized a constitutional right to pre-
sent a wrong-person defense.109  In that case, the defendant was con-
victed of murder and other offenses.110  Like the defendant in Cham-
bers, he had a two-pronged defense: first, that he was not guilty, and 
second, that someone else committed the crime.111
At trial, the prosecution relied heavily on forensic proof.112  As 
the first prong of his defense, Holmes introduced expert testimony to 
show that the forensic evidence had been contaminated and that the 
police had framed him.113  For the second prong of his defense, 
Holmes proferred evidence that one Jimmy McCaw White had com-
mitted the murder.114  White had been in the victim’s neighborhood 
at the time of the assault and had confessed and acknowledged 
Holmes’s innocence four different times.115  However, at a pre-trial 
hearing White provided an alibi and, like McDonald in Chambers, de-
nied making incriminating statements.116  The trial court excluded 
the evidence of White’s guilt.117  It first held, based on state court 
precedent,118 that the third-party guilt evidence was inadmissible be-
cause it did not  “raise a reasonable inference . . . as to [the defen-
dant’s] own innocence.”119  The State Supreme Court affirmed, but 
articulated a more specific, different  rule.  It held that ‘where there 
is strong evidence of an appellant’s guilt, especially where there is 
strong forensic evidence, the proffered evidence about a third party’s 
 107 Id. at 302–03. 
 108 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 319.  Commentators have noted that the right to compul-
sory process involves fairness and parity: the right is designed to give the defendant 
the same powers to produce evidence as the prosecutor.  See AMAR, supra note 58, at 
132–34. 
 109 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 331. 
 110 Id. at 322. 
 111 Id. at 322–23. 
 112 Id. at 322. 
 113 Id. at 322–23. 
 114 Id. at 323. 
 115 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 323. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 323. 
 118 Id. at 323–24 (citing State v. Gregory, 16 S.E.2d. 532, 534 (S.C. 1941)). 
 119 Id. (quoting Gregory, 16 S.E.2d at 534). 
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alleged guilt does not raise a reasonable inference as to appellant’s 
own innocence.’”120
In an opinion by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court reversed.121  
First, the Court reiterated the constitutional rule that a state statute 
or rule that limits the defendant’s right to present a defense must not 
be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes it was designed to 
serve.  Applying that standard, the Court held that the defendant’s 
constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a defense 
was violated by the rule that precluded third-party guilt evidence 
where the prosecution introduces “forensic evidence that, if believed, 
strongly supports a guilty verdict.”122
First, the Court held that the trial judge erroneously relied on 
the strength of the prosecution’s evidence to determine admissibil-
ity.123  The Court explained that “by evaluating the strength of only 
one party’s evidence, no logical conclusion can be reached regarding 
the strength of contrary evidence offered by the other side to rebut 
or cast doubt.”124  Thus, the rule was “arbitrary” because it did not ra-
tionally serve the purpose it was designed to further.125  Interestingly, 
the “purpose” of the rule against the admission of third-party guilt 
evidence was not identified.  The Court did acknowledge the author-
ity of the courts to exclude evidence where its probative value is out-
weighed by the risk of “unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
potential to mislead the jury.”126  Presumably it was these traditional 
interests that the rule was designed to protect because the Court in-
dicated that the state had not “identified any other legitimate end 
that the rule serves.”127  Second, the Court held that the ruling was 
arbitrary because it permitted the lower court to exclude defense evi-
dence based on a presumption that the prosecution’s proof was 
credible and reliable, without any inquiry into the strength of the 
prosecution’s proof.128  For these two reasons, the exclusionary rule 
did not serve the legitimate purpose third-party culpability rules are 
otherwise designed to serve, i.e., “to focus the trial on the central is-
 120 Id. at 324 (quoting State v. Holmes, 605 S.E.2d 19, 24 (S.C. 2004)). 
 121 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 331. 
 122 Id. at 321, 331. 
 123 Id. at 330–31. 
 124 Id. at 331. 
 125 Id. at 331. 
 126 Id. at 326. 
 127 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 331. 
 128 Id. at 329–30. 
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sues by excluding evidence that has only a very weak logical connec-
tion to the central issues.”129
The Court gave no meaningful guidance to the lower courts 
about the standards that should govern the admissibility of third-party 
guilt evidence.  Justice Alito expressed no preference for the various 
approaches taken by the lower courts.130  As noted above, the Court 
cited opinions from several states that articulated various standards 
for excluding third-party guilt evidence when it fails to raise a reason-
able doubt of the defendant’s guilt, is “so remote and lack[s] such 
connection with the crime;” “does not sufficiently connect the other 
person to the crime; . . . [or] is speculative or remote or does not 
tend to prove or disprove a material fact in issue at the defendant’s 
trial.”131  It noted that “[s]uch rules are widely accepted, and neither 
petitioner nor his amici challenge them here.”132  The Court did not 
discuss the application of any of these standards. 
  In addition, the Court weakened even the precedential value of 
its own opinion as a guide to the lower courts by relying on Corpus Ju-
ris133 and American Jurisprudence.134  As scholars have noted, these sec-
ondary authorities have virtually no weight or persuasive value and 
are so general that “lower courts will not adopt quoted material from 
such sources” as representing the Supreme Court’s view one way or 
the other.135  
IV. THE WRONG-PERSON DEFENSE IN THE LOWER COURTS 
As noted above, the Holmes Court explicitly left unchallenged 
and unexamined the various state court rules governing admissibility 
of third-party guilt evidence, noting that “[s]uch rules are widely ac-
cepted, and neither petitioner nor his amici challenge them here.”136  
In short, the Supreme Court has left it up to the states.  Unfortu-
nately, the states’ treatment of the wrong-person defense is utterly 
chaotic; the states have no coherent test for protecting the right to 
 129 Id. at 330. 
 130 Id. at 327. 
 131 Id. at 327 (internal citations omitted). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 327–28 (citing State v. Gregory, 16 S.E.2d 532, 534–35 (S.C. 
1941)). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Michael H. Graham, Evidence and Trial Advocacy: Advanced Workshop Third Party 
Culpability Evidence; Holmes v. South Carolina, ___ U.S. ___ , 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 
L.Ed.2d 503 (2006), and More, 43 No. 1 CRIM. LAW BULL. 1, 109 (Jan.–Feb. 2007). 
 136 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 327. 
GRIFFIN (FINAL) 1/28/2009  11:08:31 AM 
146 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:129 
 
present this defense.137  Not surprisingly, the decisions yield unpre-
dictable results.  Indeed, the standards for admissibility are even ar-
ticulated in many different and confusing ways.  Some courts apply 
the narrow “direct connection,”138 or clear nexus139 test; others ask 
whether the evidence has a “legitimate tendency” to prove someone 
else committed the crime, which frequently requires a direct connec-
tion.140  Other courts ask whether the evidence is sufficient to raise a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt141 or has a “legitimate 
tendency” to do so;142 others employ a probative value versus preju-
dice balancing test.143  Under that test, the alleged “prejudice” is not 
the traditional notion of prejudice.  Rather, the prejudice is claimed 
to result from disruption of the trial with an allegedly collateral issue 
or from forcing the prosecution to meet the additional proof.144  
Moreover, some courts alternate between these different tests.145  Ad-
ditionally, the courts address the issue not as a constitutional matter 
but as a garden-variety issue of evidentiary admissibility.146  On appeal, 
virtually all of the courts review a judge’s exclusion of third-party guilt 
evidence under the broad abuse of discretion standard for eviden-
tiary rulings rather than under the more exacting standard of review 
for constitutional violations.147
What the lower courts really appear to be doing is excluding 
third-party guilt evidence where they do not believe that the prosecu-
tion has the wrong person.  Rather than focusing on the overall proof 
that the defendant may not be the person who committed the crime 
(both the first and second parts of the wrong-person defense), courts 
focus solely on the second part (the piece or pieces of evidence 
sought to be offered against the third party).148  This treatment is not 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis of the issue in Chambers 
and Holmes, or with the Court’s long-standing protection of the right 
to present a complete defense in general; nor is this approach the 
 137 McCord, supra note 4, at 938. 
 138 See infra notes 164–82 and accompanying text. 
 139 See McCord, supra note 4, at 938–42. 
 140 See infra notes 198–208 and accompanying text. 
 141 See infra notes 183–91 and accompanying text. 
 142 See infra notes 183–91 and accompanying text. 
 143 See infra notes 209–22 and accompanying text. 
 144 See infra notes 209–22 and accompanying text. 
 145 See, e.g., People v. Hall, 718 P.2d 99, 101 (Cal. 1986) (en banc); see also State v. 
Cotto, 865 A.2d 660, 669 (N.J. 2005). 
 146 See infra notes 209–22 and accompanying text. 
 147 See infra notes 190–99 and accompanying text. 
 148 See infra notes 164–222 and accompanying text. 
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best way to protect the Court’s concern about reliability.  By attempt-
ing to articulate standards of admissibility for only part of the defense 
rather than balancing prosecution and defense interests in the de-
fense of innocence as a whole and fashioning an appropriate consti-
tutional balancing test for that defense, the lower courts have ended 
up with no coherent rules at all. 
The most exacting state standard of admissibility for third-party 
guilt evidence requires proof of a “direct connection” or “direct link” 
between the third party and the crime charged.149  Under that stan-
dard, evidence that a third party may be guilty of the charged crime is 
inadmissible, regardless of the other proof, unless the defense pro-
duces evidence “to directly connect [the] third person to the crime 
charged.”150  In applying this standard, the courts analyze only the 
proffered evidence; they do not look at the rest of the proof or 
whether the first part of the wrong-person defense has been estab-
lished.151  That is, there is no evaluation of whether there is a thresh-
old credible basis to believe the defendant may not have committed 
the crime. 
For example, in State v. Grega,152 the defendant was convicted of 
anal rape and murder of his wife in a vacation condominium.  The 
evidence against him was circumstantial and not very strong.  There 
were no eyewitnesses and no forensic proof to identify him as the kil-
ler.  He reported the death, was extremely upset when the police ar-
rived, consented to a search, and voluntarily gave several statements 
to the police.153  Those statements revealed some inconsistencies.  
There was evidence that supported the inference that the condomin-
ium had been wiped down, and clothing found in the laundry ma-
chine contained some blood that could not be identified.154  Paper 
towels stained with blood were found in a common trash receptacle 
in a garbage bag that contained the defendant’s fingerprints, a toilet 
was stopped up by a wad of paper towels, and a box of Marlboro ciga-
rettes were found stuck to the inside of the toilet.155  The defendant 
claimed he had been out with his son and returned to find his wife 
dead.156
 149 See generally McCord, supra note 4, at 920–38. 
 150 State v. Grega, 721 A.2d 445, 454 (Vt. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting 
State v. Gilman, 608 A.2d 660, 663 (Vt. 1992)). 
 151 Id. 
 152 721 A.2d 445 (1998). 
 153 Id. at 449. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 449–50. 
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There was evidence concerning two painters who were present at 
the condominium development where the deceased was raped and 
killed.157  Both had given false addresses to the police, both were in-
carcerated for other crimes at the time of the trial, and both testified 
as prosecution witnesses.158  One of them had lied to the police about 
when he arrived home the night of the murder and admitted buying 
Marlboro cigarettes.159  The other admitted that he had joked about 
killing a woman.160  The defendant proffered additional evidence re-
lating to their sexual practices, history of assaults, threatening behav-
ior, and theft.161  That evidence was excluded as insufficiently linked 
to the crime.162  In addition, a statement by one of them claiming re-
sponsibility for the crime was excluded as hearsay.163  The court found 
no deprivation of the right to present a defense largely because of the 
absence of a “direct link” to the actual crimes.164  It made no refer-
ence to whether there was a credible basis to believe that someone 
other than the defendant had committed the crimes. 
Under the same standard, in State v. West, evidence of latent, 
unidentified fingerprints found at the murder scene was deemed in-
admissible where there was no explanation for the prints, when they 
were left, or who had left them.165  Similarly, in Klinect v. State, evi-
dence that a testifying accomplice who had been present at the scene 
had a violent disposition was excluded because it did not “connect 
[him] with the corpus delicti, or show that [he had] recently commit-
ted a crime of the same or similar nature.”166
A second standard articulated by the state courts asks whether 
the proffered evidence is “capable of raising a reasonable doubt” as 
to a defendant’s guilt.  That analysis was used in State v. Cotto,167 where 
the defendant was charged with robbery and related offenses.  The 
defendant presented an alibi defense.168  He also offered evidence to 
show that a fellow inmate, a relative of the victims, identified two 
other people including the victim’s cousin, as having planned a simi-
 157 Id. at 453. 
 158 Grega, 721 A.2d at 453. 
 159 Id. at 453–54. 
 160 Id. at 454. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 456. 
 163 Id. at 455. 
 164 Grega, 721 A.2d at 456. 
 165 State v. West, 877 A.2d 787 (Conn. 2005). 
 166 Klinect v. State, 501 S.E.2d 810, 814 (Ga. 1998). 
 167 865 A.2d 660 (N.J. 2005). 
 168 Id. at 666. 
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lar robbery, the inference being that they committed the charged 
robbery instead of the defendant.169  That witness repeated the in-
formation to the defendant’s investigator but refused to testify at 
trial.170  At trial, the defendant was identified by the victim, his former 
girlfriend, who also had identified him immediately after the crime.171
The trial court denied the defendant’s proffer because, accord-
ing to the court, the evidence that others had planned a similar rob-
bery had no “rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with 
respect to an essential feature of the State’s case.”172  Like many other 
courts, although it used the reasonable doubt standard, this court ul-
timately balanced prejudice versus probative value, holding that the 
proffered evidence was “so speculative and . . . full of conjecture and 
hearsay . . .  [that] the prejudicial value . . . outweigh[ed] the proba-
tive value.”173  The appellate court reviewed the trial court’s exclusion 
of the evidence under an abuse of discretion standard and held that 
the trial court had not abused its discretion.174
Similarly, in People v. Valencia, the court excluded third-party 
guilt evidence of motive and opportunity on the ground that the 
third-party guilt evidence failed to raise a reasonable doubt.175  In Va-
lencia, the court looked only at the evidence sought to be admitted to 
determine whether that evidence alone raised a reasonable doubt; it 
did not evaluate whether the proffered evidence, together with the 
other proof, raised a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt. 
In Valencia, the defendant was convicted of child endangerment 
and inflicting corporal punishment on a child.176  He proffered evi-
dence that another person, E., had caused her injuries.177  The evi-
dence would have shown that E. had lived with the child, had struck 
the child as well as another child, had a short temper with children, 
and had admitted being forced to leave the defendant’s home be-
cause the defendant thought she had acted inappropriately toward 
 169 Id. at 669. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 666. 
 172 Id. at 669 (citing State v. Fortin, 843 A.2d 974, 1003 (N.J. 2004)); see also State v. 
Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 977 (N.J. 1988); State v. Fulston, 738 A.2d 380, 384 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
 173 Cotto, 865 A.2d at 669. 
 174 Id. at 670. 
 175 People v. Valencia, No. C048420, 2006 WL 1545558 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d June 7, 
2006). 
 176 Id. at *1. 
 177 Id. at *4. 
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the children.178  In addition, the evidence showed that the defendant 
had the “narrowest window [of opportunity to injure the child] than 
a number of people, but in particular, [a narrower opportunity than 
E.].”179  The trial court excluded the third-party guilt evidence as 
showing “no more than ‘perhaps an opportunity’ for E.” to have 
committed the crimes.180  The appellate court reviewed the ruling 
under the abuse of discretion standard and affirmed.  Mixing at least 
two standards of admissibility, the court held that “[n]one of this evi-
dence or speculation raised a reasonable doubt as to [the defen-
dant’s] guilt” and that the evidence had “no tendency in reason to 
prove any material point and is thus irrelevant.”181
A third test used by the courts asks whether the proffered evi-
dence has a “legitimate tendency” to prove that a third party commit-
ted the crime.182  For example, in State v. Denny, evidence that any of 
several third parties had motives to commit the crime as well as 
criminal dispositions was excluded.183  Again, although it articulated 
the standard as “legitimate tendency,” the court also excluded the 
evidence because it did not show “a direct connection between the 
[third party] and the crime.”184
Hawaii also used the “legitimate tendency” test in State v. Rabel-
lizsa.185  In Rabellizsa, the defendant was convicted of murder.186  The 
evidence included the testimony of one Mark Paishon that two days 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at *5. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Valencia, 2006 WL 1545558 at *5.  See also People v. Guillen, No. B188362, 2006 
WL 3262343 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Nov. 13, 2006).  In Guillen, the defendant was con-
victed of possessing various drugs found in his office, car, and trailer.  Id. at *1.  He 
sought to present evidence that any one of three men might have placed the drugs in 
these locations to frame him.  Id. at *2.  Two of the three had motive and opportu-
nity to commit the crimes, and one of them had previously tried to frame the defen-
dant with a false charge of kidnapping.  Id.  The court held that the evidence was 
properly excluded because there was “no direct or circumstantial evidence to link 
any one of these men to the crime.”  Id.  Even though one of the men had previously 
tried to frame the defendant, the evidence was deemed short of connecting that per-
son to the crime charged.  Id. at *3. 
 182 See Brett C. Powell, Perry Mason Meets the “Legitimate Tendency” Standard of Admis-
sibility (and Doesn’t Like What He Sees), 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2001). 
 183 State v. Denny, 357 N.W.2d 12, 18 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984). 
 184 Id. at 17. 
 185 State v. Rabellizsa, 903 P.2d 43, 47 (Haw. 1995).  Again, however, the court de-
fined the “legitimate tendency” test as relevance, i.e., that “‘relevant evidence means 
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact . . . more or less prob-
able.’” Id. (quoting HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 401 (LexisNexis 2008)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 186 Id. at 48. 
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before the victim’s death the victim sped down Paishon’s street nearly 
hitting some children, and that Paishon’s girlfriend and the defen-
dant’s mother were upset by the incident.187  There was evidence that 
the victim was screaming at Paishon after he “had told the victim not 
to speed . . . because ‘a lot of kids [were] there.’”188
There were no eyewitnesses to the killing; however, prosecution 
witnesses identified the defendant’s car near the scene and leaving 
the scene of the murder, and a long-time friend of the defendant saw 
the defendant with a gun at a different location immediately after the 
shooting.189  Moreover, as the victim died, he said to his friend Joe, 
“Joe, Rabellizsa I gonna die.”190  The defendant intended to proffer 
evidence that the victim had threatened Paishon and “ran him off the 
road while driving a car,” allegedly giving Paishon a motive to kill the 
victim.191  Again, the court combined admissibility standards: al-
though it articulated a “legitimate tendency” standard, it held that 
the evidence of third-party motive was inadmissible because there was 
no direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the 
actual perpetration of the crime.192
Many courts have now moved away from the more rigid stan-
dards and treat third-party guilt evidence under the traditional rele-
vance standard.193  If the evidence is deemed relevant, its probative 
 187 Id. at 44. 
 188 Id. (alteration in original). 
 189 Id. at 45. 
 190 Id. at 44. 
 191 Rabellizsa, 903 P.2d at 44. 
 192 Id. at 47. 
 193 See, e.g., People v. Primo, 753 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2001).  There, the defendant 
was charged with attempted murder based on a shooting.  Id. at 165.  He tried to in-
troduce evidence that the gun used in the shooting had been used two months later 
by a third party who had been present at the shooting.  Id.  The victim identified the 
defendant as the shooter.  Id. at 166.  The defendant admitted that he and the victim 
were arguing, but he claimed that the victim knocked him down.  Id.  After that, the 
defendant heard gunshots but did not know who fired the gun or that the victim had 
been wounded.  Id.  The principal issue at trial was whether the defendant was the 
shooter.  Id. 
Prior to trial, the prosecution produced a ballistics report that linked the gun 
used in the shooting to a crime two months later committed by one Maurice Booker.  
Id.  Two prosecution witnesses placed Booker at the scene.  Id.  Nevertheless, the trial 
court refused to admit the ballistics report into evidence “stating that ‘there [was] 
not evidence-in-chief before this jury placing Mr. Booker inside [the deli] or even 
outside [the deli] at a time that’s relevant.’”  Id. (alteration in original).  The defen-
dant was convicted of attempted murder.  Id.  The Appellate Division affirmed on the 
ground that “the defense had ‘failed to show a clear link between the third party and 
the crime in question.’”  Id. (quoting People v. Primo, 704 N.Y.S.2d 112, 112 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2000)). 
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value is balanced against the risk of undue prejudice, jury confusion, 
or waste of judicial resources.194  Under this test, too, the courts’ 
analysis is myopic.  For example, in State v. Larson the defendant was 
found guilty of murder based on a drive-by shooting.195  There was 
credible evidence showing that he was not the shooter: he was not 
identified as being involved in the shooting and none of the finger-
prints or molds of foot prints or tire prints were connected to either 
the defendant or those who were with him that evening.196  Moreover, 
the state’s theory “would have required the defendant to drive an av-
erage speed of somewhere between 95 and 370 miles per hour.”197  As 
for the prosecution’s case, it was entirely circumstantial.  The shotgun 
used was linked to shotgun shells found near a car the defendant was 
identified as having been in earlier that evening; he was identified as 
being in that car by a woman driving by in another car at the same 
time—she helped the police make a composite sketch of the person 
she had seen in the car.198  The witness did not identify the defendant 
as the driver until the trial.199  In addition, there was evidence that the 
defendant’s car was capable of driving over one hundred miles per 
hour and that he drove like a race car driver when drinking.200
As the court noted, drive-by shootings are rare in South Da-
kota.201  Nevertheless, at trial, the defendant proffered evidence of 
two other drive-by shootings that night with which he was not even 
alleged to have been involved.202  The court refused to admit this evi-
The Court of Appeals reversed, discarding the “clear link” standard in favor of a 
simple relevance standard.  Id. at 167.  Under that standard, “evidence is relevant if it 
tends to prove the existence or non-existence of a material fact, i.e., a fact directly in 
issue in the case.”  Id. 
Noting that the ballistics report was relevant evidence, and that there was proof 
that Booker was at the scene, the court held “its probative value plainly outweigh[ed] 
the dangers of delay, prejudice and confusion.”  Id. at 169.  Significantly, the court 
relied in part on the fact that the evidence was relevant to the identity of the shooter, 
which the defendant placed at issue by admitting his presence at the scene and 
claiming that he heard a gun shot but did not know from where it had come.  Id. 
 194 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 195 State v. Larson, 512 N.W.2d 732 (S.D. 1994). 
 196 Id. at 734–35. 
 197 Id. at 736. 
 198 Id. at 735. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 736. 
 201 Larson, 512 N.W.2d at 739. 
 202 Id.  The proof the defendant intended to present included evidence that on 
the evening of the killing, a shot was allegedly fired at a vehicle and marks were 
found that could have been caused by a shotgun.  Id.  Additionally, later the same 
night, a witness heard a shotgun blast from a van.  Id. 
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dence, and the appellate court affirmed.203  In excluding the evi-
dence, the court did not look at both parts of the wrong-person de-
fense because it did not evaluate whether the defendant had made a 
credible showing that he had not been the shooter.204  Instead, the 
court held that the probative value of the evidence of the two other 
drive-by shootings – on its own -  did not overcome the state’s inter-
ests in reliability and in “promoting orderly and efficient trials.”205  
That is, the admission of the evidence would disrupt the trial with a 
collateral issue and require the prosecution to meet it.  Accordingly, 
the state appellate court held that the evidence was properly ex-
cluded.206
 203 Id. at 740. 
 204 Id. at 739–40. 
 205 Id. at 740. 
 206 The federal courts similarly analyze the admissibility of third-party perpetrator 
evidence under the relevance standard of Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
and then employ the prejudice versus probative value balancing test of Rule 403.  
Again, this approach applies the same misleading focus on only half of the defense—
the degree of nexus between the third-party guilt evidence and the crime and then 
on the claimed disruption of the trial and prejudice to the government.  FED. R. EVID. 
401, 403. 
A recent example is United States v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2007).  In Jor-
dan, the defendant was charged with killing a fellow inmate.  Id. at 1216.  He sought 
to show that another inmate had been the killer.  Id. at 1218.  Relying on Holmes, the 
Tenth Circuit reiterated that although the bar for admission of evidence under Rule 
401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is low, the trial courts have discretion to ex-
clude relevant evidence under Rule 403 “‘if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury.’”  Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403).  Under this standard, the court of appeals ex-
plained that district courts may deny admission of third-party guilt evidence if it “fails 
to establish, either on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record, a 
non-speculative ‘nexus’ between the crime charged and the alleged perpetrator.”  Id. 
at 1219. 
In contrast, in Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1996) (en banc), the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for first degree murder on 
the ground, inter alia, that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that a third 
party had a motive to kill the victim and had recently tried to do so.  Id. at 3, 6.  The 
Court of Appeals rejected the “clearly linked” phraseology and adopted the tradi-
tional relevance standard.  Id. at 3.  It qualified that standard, however, as “evidence 
of motivation of a third party to commit the crime charged risks distracting the jury 
from the issue of this defendant’s guilt or innocence, and in applying the relevance 
standard the judge may properly take account of that danger.”  Id. 
In Winfield, the government presented identification evidence from three eye-
witnesses that the defendant had chased down and shot one Deborah Davis.  Id.  
However, there was no evidence of a motive for the killing.  Id.  The defense sought 
to prove that Davis was one of three people who committed an armed robbery, that 
she had agreed to help the prosecution in the case against the other two perpetra-
tors, and that one of the other participants killed her to silence her.  Id.  In fact, the 
third party had tried to kill her once before, and when she was finally gunned down, 
her assailant said “You won’t tell this.”  Id.  On the other hand, a photograph of the 
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V. A COHERENT CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
When it articulated the right to present a defense, the Supreme 
Court found that right in both the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and in the Sixth Amendment right to compul-
sory process.207  Later, as the issue of incorporation arose, the Court 
held that the right was incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a component of due process of law.208  Ultimately, in 
Holmes, the Court ruled that whether it is located in the confrontation 
or compulsory process clauses of the Sixth Amendment or directly in 
the due process clause, the right to “a meaningful opportunity to pre-
sent a complete defense” clearly exists and prohibits arbitrary or dis-
alleged third-party killer had been placed in a photo array and none of the witnesses 
identified him as the killer.  Id. (internal footnote omitted). 
The trial court excluded the evidence that someone else had killed Davis be-
cause the third party had not been identified or placed at the scene, there was no 
proof that the third party knew where Davis could be located, and there was no proof 
that the third party knew that the victim had testified in the grand jury the day she 
was killed.  Id.  Interestingly, the trial judge noted “[t]he inherent ambiguity of this evi-
dence supposedly linking [the third party] to the murder would not . . . tend to cre-
ate a reasonable doubt that the defendant who was apparently known by many of the 
eyewitnesses did not commit the offense.”  Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
Sitting en banc, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the convic-
tion.  Id. at 7.  It held that the standard applicable to third-party guilt evidence is the 
same as that applicable to other evidence, i.e., that evidence is admissible if it will 
“tend to indicate some reasonable possibility that a person other than the defendant 
committed the charged offense.”  Id. at 4–5 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 552 
A.2d 513, 516 (D.C. 1989)).  Once the evidence is deemed relevant, a trial “judge 
must also balance the probative value of the evidence ‘against the risk of prejudicial 
impact.’”  Id. at 5 (quoting Punch v. United States, 377 A.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C. 1977)).  
The trial judge may exclude marginally relevant evidence that risks confusion that 
may be exacerbated if the government asserts the need to present rebuttal proof.  Id.  
The judge has wide latitude to limit the extent of such testimony.  Id.  However, in 
this case, the evidence of the third party’s motive, the prior attempt to kill the wit-
ness, the fact that the witness was killed on the same day she testified in the grand 
jury, and that the killer had said something about “snitching” when he shot her was 
highly probative, even in the absence of evidence that the third party had been at the 
scene.  Id. at 6.  Reversing, the court explained that “a substantial proffer that a third 
party committed the offense implicates the defendant’s constitutional right to ‘a 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’”  Id. at 6–7 (quoting Crane 
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).  Moreover, evidence of similar “recent as-
saults against the victim stemming from identical motivation” was deemed highly 
probative.  Id. at 7. 
 207 See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961) (finding the right to have 
defendant’s counsel question defendant to elicit his statement is protected by the 
Due Process Clause); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (finding that a de-
fendant “has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense.”). 
 208 Washington, 388 U.S. at 17–19. 
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proportionate limits on a defendant’s right to present evidence.209  As 
the Supreme Court has stated, there are “[f]ew rights . . . more fun-
damental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own de-
fense.”210
The lower courts’ treatment of the wrong-person defense does 
not protect the defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete 
defense and it does not adequately protect the states’ interests in reli-
ability and efficiency.  The courts’ difficulty in articulating a coherent 
analysis of the wrong-person defense may be the result of the unique-
ness of the defense because it is a two-prong defense—i.e., “I didn’t 
do it and here’s who did.”  Without a threshold examination of the 
evidence as a whole, and therefore stripped of its context, the lower 
courts almost inevitably conclude that any individual piece of evi-
dence that someone else might be the criminal is collateral or will 
disrupt the trial.211  Only by employing an analysis that addresses the 
two-pronged nature of the defense can courts adequately and fairly 
protect the right to present it.  That treatment would also be consis-
tent with the analysis the Court used throughout its more general 
right to present a defense jurisprudence.212
Accordingly, the trial courts should treat the wrong-person de-
fense under the following analysis: first, a threshold determination 
should be made as to whether the defendant has raised a credible ba-
sis to believe that he did not commit the crime.  If that threshold is 
met, the defendant’s third-party guilt evidence should be admitted 
under the constitutional balancing test prescribed by the Supreme 
Court.  That test balances the government’s interest in reliable proof 
and orderly procedure213 against the defendant’s right to present a 
complete defense. 214  Once the defendant has made a credible show-
ing that he is not the person who committed the crime, the defen-
dant’s interest should outweigh any government interest in excluding 
third-party guilt evidence and there should be a presumption in favor 
of its admissibility. 
 209 Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting Crane, 476 U.S. at 
690). 
 210 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (internal citations omitted). 
 211 See, e.g., supra notes 166–178 and accompanying text. 
 212 See, e.g., supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.  
 213 State v. Larson, 512 N.W.2d 732, 740 (S.D. 1994). 
 214 Once the government’s interest in excluding the evidence is identified, the in-
dividual’s “competing interest must be closely examined.”  Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 
U.S. 37, 67 (1996) (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295). 
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A. The Government’s Interest 
The prosecution has no legitimate interest in convicting an in-
nocent person.  Moreover, while the state has an interest in reliable 
proof that may support state evidentiary rules, those rules are uncon-
stitutionally arbitrary and disproportionate when, as in Crane and 
Rock, they exclude otherwise reliable evidence.215  The interest in reli-
able proof that allegedly requires the exclusion of third-party guilt 
evidence is surely at its lowest where there is a credible showing that 
the defendant did not commit the crime. 
Moreover, the courts’ focus on the probative value of proffered 
evidence is not the most logical way to protect states’ interest in reli-
able proof.  As noted above, the third-party guilt defense is different 
from other defenses because the defendant rarely has the resources 
to “make a case” against someone else.  He may be able to elicit some 
sort of proof, but, as the cases show, that proof is rarely going to be 
sufficiently probative to establish anyone else’s direct connection to 
the crime.  It may include motive, opportunity, criminal disposition, 
or other pieces of proof, but it is unlikely to be complete.  On the 
other hand, the defense does have the ability to raise a credible claim 
that the defendant did not commit the crime, either through cross-
examination of identification witnesses, expert testimony, or evi-
dence.  A reliable basis for concluding that the defendant may not 
have committed the crime is a better way to protect the prosecution 
from unreliable proof that someone else did it.  The focus on that 
showing is the most fair and logical way to protect the state’s interest 
in reliability. 
Regardless of the test articulated, many courts exclude third-
party guilt evidence on the ground that it injects collateral issues into 
the trial or confuses the jury.216  Where the defense has already raised 
a credible basis for believing that the defendant did not commit the 
crime, however, that someone else did it simply is not collateral.  
Moreover, any concern about jury confusion or alleged risk of specu-
lation is minimized by anchoring the third-party guilt evidence in the 
threshold showing that the named defendant is not the right defen-
dant.  Once that threshold of proof is there, the jury can evaluate the 
 215 Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (finding the opportunity to be 
heard “would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude competent, re-
liable evidence . . . when such evidence is central to the defendant’s claim of inno-
cence”); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 66 (1987) (noting that unless the state shows 
that hypnotically enhanced testimony is always untrustworthy, a state’s per se exclu-
sion of all such evidence is an arbitrary restriction). 
 216 See supra Part IV. 
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third-party guilt evidence in the context of that proof, and specula-
tion thus should be minimized.217  Finally, where the evidence sup-
ports a credible showing that the prosecution has failed to prove the 
defendant is the person who committed the charged crime, the gov-
ernment cannot claim to be unfairly ambushed by proof that some-
one else committed it. 
B. The Defendant’s Interest 
In Chambers and Holmes, each of the defendants proffered evi-
dence that showed that he had not committed the charged crime.218  
In Chambers, only one officer testified that Chambers fired the fatal 
shots.219  “Although three officers saw [the deceased officer] shoot 
Chambers . . . none of them examined Chambers to see whether he 
was still alive” or armed.220  No gun was found at the scene and “there 
was no proof that Chambers had ever owned [a gun].”221  One witness 
testified that he was looking at Chambers at the time of the shooting 
and “was sure that Chambers did not fire the shots.”222  In Holmes, the 
defendant produced an expert witness who undermined the forensic 
evidence by criticizing police investigatory procedures, and another 
who supported the defendant’s claim that the police planted a palm 
print. 223  In these two cases, when the Supreme Court balanced the 
interests underlying state evidentiary rules that limited the admission 
of third-party guilt evidence against the defendant’s interest in pre-
senting the proof, it invalidated those state evidentiary rules as a vio-
 217 In any event, courts are not powerless to assist jurors in evaluating the signifi-
cance of third-party guilt evidence or of sifting through conflicting identification 
proof.  First, as courts already do, they can instruct the jurors on the Government’s 
burden of proof, on reasonable doubt, and on credibility.  See, e.g., 1 LEONARD B. 
SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL (2008).  N.Y. Criminal 
Jury Instructions 2d - Credibility, http://www.nycourts.gov/cji/1-General/CJI2d. 
credibility.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2009); N.Y. Criminal Jury Instructions 2d - Reason-
able Doubt, http://www.nycourts.gove/cji/1-General/CJI2d.presumption.burden. 
reasonable_doubt.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).  If the evidence warrants, trial courts 
can instruct the jury, in so many words, that mere suspicion or surmise that someone 
else might have committed the crime is insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt on its 
own. 
 218 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 289 (1973); Holmes v. South Carolina, 
547 U.S. 319, 330 (2006) (“[T]he petitioner proffered evidence that, if believed, 
squarely proved that [a third party] not petitioner was the perpetrator.”). 
 219 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 286, 289. 
 220 Id. at 289. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 323. 
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lation of due process.224  With the case in that posture, i.e., once the 
defendant had created a credible basis to believe he was not the kil-
ler, the defendant’s interest in telling the jury who actually commit-
ted the crime was deemed by the Court to outweigh the government’s 
interests. 
This analysis is reflected in the Court’s decisions in its three 
general right to present a defense cases.  In Rock, Ferguson, and Wash-
ington, the defendant produced some evidence tending to prove his 
defense but was prevented from presenting that defense com-
pletely.225  Again, with the cases in that posture, the Court recognized 
that the defendant’s interest was at its greatest, that the government’s 
interest was small, and that the defendants’ interests in presenting a 
complete defense thus outweighed the states’ interest in reliability.226
The importance of presenting a complete defense is also con-
firmed by other disciplines.  As other scholars have concluded, 
“[e]mpirical studies have shown that—more than legal standards, 
definitions or instructions—narrative plays a key role in the juror de-
cision-making process.”227  Because jurors try to fit evidence into a 
coherent and complete story,228 each story must have two characteris-
tics: coverage, or “the extent to which the story accounts for the evi-
dence presented at trial”; and coherence, or “consistency, plausibility 
and completeness.”229  “The party who can tell the most compelling 
story which fits best with each individual juror’s own narrative (as 
constructed from the trial evidence, background information . . . and 
expectations), will emerge the ultimate winner in the case.”230  Thus, 
the defendant’s ability to tell a plausible and complete story about his 
own innocence is the right to present a complete defense.  If the con-
stitutional right means anything, it means that a defendant who 
claims he did not commit the crime has a right to tell the jury who 
did.231
 224 Id. at 330–31; Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295–98, 302–03. 
 225 See supra notes 52, 56, 71 and accompanying text. 
 226 See supra notes 52, 56, 71 and accompanying text. 
 227 John H. Blume et al., Every Juror Wants a Story, Story: Narrative Relevance, Third 
Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense, 2 (Cornell Law School Legal Studies Re-
search Paper Series, Paper No. 06-042), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=942653. 
 228 Id. at 27. 
 229 Id. at 30–31. 
 230 Id. at 30. 
 231 See id. at 31 (“Finally, a story is complete when the structure of the story has all 
of its parts.  Missing information, or lack of plausible inferences about one or more 
major components of the story will decrease confidence in the explanation.” (citing 
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Moreover, the requirement of direct linkage of the third party 
under the traditional state tests is fundamentally unfair.  As noted 
above, one aspect of the uniqueness of the wrong-person defense is 
that the defendant rarely has the resources to make a case against 
someone else.  He may be able to elicit some sort of proof but, as the 
cases show, courts rarely consider that proof to be sufficiently proba-
tive to establish anyone else’s direct connection to the crime.  On the 
other hand, through cross-examination of identification witnesses, 
expert testimony, or other evidence, the defense has the ability to 
raise a credible claim that he did not commit the crime.  The focus 
on that threshold showing is a fair way to determine whether the sec-
ond prong of the defense should be analyzed.  It is also an effective 
way to ensure the reliability of third-party guilt evidence—much more 
effective than expecting the defendant, on his own, to show a suffi-
cient nexus to avoid exclusion of the proof.  If the defendant is capa-
ble of creating through evidence or cross-examination a credible ba-
sis for believing he is not the person who committed the crime, such 
will be a sufficient protection against the admission of unreliable 
proof. 
C. Reliance on Eyewitness Identification Evidence 
A fortiori where the prosecution relies substantially on eyewit-
ness identification testimony third-party guilt evidence should be ad-
mitted.  As a category of evidence, eyewitness identification, like ac-
complice testimony, is presumptively unreliable.232  Indeed, 
unreliable identification evidence has been responsible for more 
wrongful convictions than all other causes combined.233  If the prose-
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story 
Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 527 (1991))). 
 232 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“The vagaries of eyewit-
ness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances 
of mistaken identification.”). 
 233 See State v. Delgado, 902 A.2d 888, 895 (N.J. 2006) (“Misidentification is widely 
recognized as the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions in this country.”) 
(footnote omitted); EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE vii, xiii (1932) (“Perhaps the major source of these tragic errors is 
an identification of the accused by the victim of a crime of violence.  This mistake 
was practically alone responsible for twenty-nine of these [sixty-five wrongful] convic-
tions.”) (footnote omitted); JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO 
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 73 (2000) (“In a 
study of DNA exoneration by the Innocence Project, [eighty-four] percent of the 
wrongful convictions rested, at least in part, on mistaken identification by an eyewit-
ness or victim.”); Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the 
Criminal Justice System, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 283–93 (1988) (describing a study 
of more than two hundred felony cases of wrongful conviction that found misidenti-
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cution is relying on  evidence of dubious reliability, then the state’s 
interest in reliability is diminished.  Moreover, it is well recognized 
that jurors give disproportionate weight to identification testimony—
in fact, jurors give identification evidence more significance than 
confession evidence.234  When jurors see a victim point to a defen-
dant, one who has already been selected for prosecution, they believe 
it.235  The Supreme Court held in Crane, in overruling the exclusion 
of evidence at trial concerning the circumstances of a defendant’s 
confession, that if the defendant was “stripped of the power to de-
scribe to the jury the circumstances that prompted his confession, the 
defendant is effectively disabled from answering the one question 
every rational juror needs answered.  If the defendant is innocent, 
why did he previously admit his guilt?”236  In an identification case, 
there is one question every rational juror needs answered; if you say 
the eyewitness is wrong, who did it?237  As the Crane Court continued, 
“a defendant’s case may stand or fall on his ability to convince the 
jury that the manner in which the confession was obtained casts 
doubt on its credibility.”238  Similarly, a defendant’s case may stand or 
fall on his ability to tell the jury who committed the crime.  The jury 
is already being overly influenced on what may well be unreliable 
identification evidence.  Third-party guilt evidence is meant to cor-
rect this imbalance.  The need to dispel the jury’s over-reliance on 
eyewitness identification testimony adds to the defendant’s interest in 
presenting proof of third-party guilt. 
In addition, the government’s interest in excluding third-party 
guilt evidence where it relies on eyewitness identification is dimin-
ished.  As commentators have noted, 
[M]istaken eyewitness identifications—the most frequent single 
cause of wrongful convictions—can convince investigators early in 
a case that a particular individual is the perpetrator.  Convinced 
of guilt, investigators might then set out to obtain a confession 
from that suspect, . . . produce a false confession, . . .[and] recruit 
or encourage testimony from unreliable jailhouse snitches. . . . 
Forensic scientists, aware of the desired result of their analyses, 
fication to be the single largest source of error, accounting for more than half of 
cases that had one main cause). 
 234 ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1996) (“There is almost noth-
ing more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at 
the defendant, and says, ‘That’s the one!’”). 
 235 Id. 
 236 Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689 (1986). 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. 
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might be influenced—even unwittingly—to interpret ambiguous 
data or fabricate results to support the police theory.239
In other words, once the prosecution believes it has the right person, 
“tunnel vision” sets in and evidence inconsistent with the police the-
ory is not pursued.240
Finally, throughout history, a paramount and underlying ration-
ale of the compulsory process clause has been the requirement of 
parity.241  The right to compulsory process was intended to give the 
defense the same right to present evidence as the prosecution.242  An 
evolved notion of parity would require that if the prosecution is al-
lowed to produce and rely on notoriously unreliable identification 
proof, the defense must have an ability to rebut that proof without 
being subjected to a higher threshold than the prosecution.243
D. Review for Constitutional Error 
Finally, the claimed deprivation of the right to present a wrong-
person defense should be reviewed on appeal de novo.  The abuse of 
discretion standard used by the state courts simply is not appropriate 
for review of a constitutional threshold.244  If a violation is then found, 
it should be subjected to constitutional harmless error analysis.  If the 
government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that exclusion of the 
defense was harmless because the evidence was cumulative or weak, 
the conviction will not be reversed.245  In making that determination, 
the appellate court is required to evaluate the record de novo.246
VI. CONCLUSION 
The right to present a wrong-person defense is not being han-
dled effectively by the lower courts.  The Supreme Court has left the 
issue entirely up to the states.  The states have an illogical, ineffective, 
 239 See, e.g., Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel 
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292–93 (2006) (internal footnotes 
omitted). 
 240 Id. at 293 n.15 (“[A]ll that confirms the diagnosis makes a strong imprint on 
the mind, while all that runs counter to it is received with diverted attention.”) (quot-
ing JOINT CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS’N & ASS’N OF AM. 
LAW SCH., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE, in 44 
A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958)). 
 241 See supra notes 24–34 and accompanying text. 
 242 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 243 See supra notes 32, 34 and accompanying text. 
 244 See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996). 
 245 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22–24 (1967). 
 246 See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 (1991). 
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and disingenuous method of analysis that serves neither the states’ 
nor the defendants’ interests.  The importance of the wrong-person 
defense has never been greater, given the unreliability of identifica-
tion proof and its role in causing wrongful convictions. 
Rather than focus solely on the third-party guilt evidence sought 
to be introduced—treating the issue as a mere evidentiary ruling—
the courts should recognize the unique two-pronged nature of the 
wrong-person defense: “I didn’t do it, and this is who did.”  First, the 
courts should determine whether the defendant has proffered suffi-
cient evidence that he is not the person who committed the crime.  
Second, if that threshold is established, the third-party guilt evidence 
should be admitted.  That is how the Supreme Court protected the 
right to present a wrong-person defense in Chambers and Holmes.  This 
analysis recognizes the constitutional underpinnings of the right to 
make the wrong-person defense, and it properly balances the state’s 
interests in reliability and efficiency against the defendant’s unique 
and powerful interests in presenting a complete defense. 
